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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
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AUGUST, 1970

NuMBER 3

PERSONAL INJURY: SOME ADMIRALTY RULES
APPLICABLE IN OKLAHOMA
W. JAY JONES*

PART I
Introduction
Much has been written in the general maritime field of
injuries to seamen. This topic has been covered in comprehensive studies by both students and authorities.1 Logically,
however, the subject has remained virtually untouched by
the legal publications of land-locked Oklahoma,2 but with the
advent of commercial water traffic in this state within the
near future, the subject can no longer be ignored. It is indeed
a very rare occasion when, in the twentieth century, an inland state with no admiralty or maritime case law background
suddenly becomes a major "sea" port. The purpose of this
*W. Jay Jones, B.B.A. Oklahoma University, J.D. Tulsa University. Mr. Jones is currently with the Legal Department,
Texas Pacific Oil Company, Dallas, Texas.
1 See Foley, A Survey of the Maritime Doctrine of Seaworthiness, 46 ORE. L. REv. 369 (1967); Kunzel, The Seaman's Personal Injury Action and the Jury Trial, 2 SAx DIEGo L. REV.

25 (1965); Comment, Crew Conduct as Unseaworthiness,
15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 265 (1966); 18 HAST. L.J. 981 (1967);
4 Hous. L. Ruv. 153 (1966); 44 OR L. REv. 112 (1965); 22
U. Mix
L. REv. 937 (1968); 13 VmL. L. REv. 187 (1967); 15
W. RES. L. REV. 753 (1964); 75 YALE L.J. 1174 (1966) for

some recent materials in this area. See also Boner, One if
by Land, Two if by Sea, 30 TEX. L. REv. 489 (1952); Freedman, Current Trends in the Admiralty Law, 1 NACCA L.J.
67 (1948); Howe, Rights of Maritime Workers, 5 NACCA
L.J. 146 (1950) for some general discussions concerning seamen's recovery.

See 20 OILA. L. REv. 303 (1967) for a short note concerning
limitation of liability in admiralty and its applicability to
Oklahoma.
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paper is not merely to resurvey any of these subjects or to
rehash old concepts, although some review is necessary, but
to focus on some fundamental rules which have developed,
through court or legislative action, in the area of injuries to
seamen, with the object of presenting some problems and unfamiliar concepts which may confront Oklahoma courts, both
state and federal, upon the completion of the Arkansas River
Project in the 1970's. Before these peculiar admiralty concepts
can be more fully understood some discussion and review of
the content of the doctrines to which they apply is necessary.
The presentation of these doctrines (including statutory material) is not exhaustive and will touch only on their fundamental bases.
Maintenance and Cure
From time immemorial men have "gone down to the sea
in ships" and then, as now, mariners have been injured or
have become ill without fault or wilful misconduct on their
part. Such seamen have always been accorded relief by the
general maritime law, such relief being known as "maintenance and cure," one of the earliest forms of workmen's compensation. 3 Under this doctrine, the seaman who is injured or
becomes ill, without fault or wilful misconduct on his part,
is entitled, at the shipowner's expense, to his wages to the
end of the voyage plus subsistence, lodging, and medical care
until the maximum cure obtainable has been reached. 4 Such
protection has been afforded seamen since the earliest sea8 1 M. NosRIS, THE LAW OF SEA=.MN § 536, at 577 (2nd ed.

1962) ("Maintenance and cure as a workingman's remedy
anticipated industrial workmen's compensation by a thousand years.")
4 See 1 M. NoRPus, supra note 3, § 540 (What is Maintenance),
§ 541 (The Meaning of Cure), § 546 (Of What it Consists),
§ 551 (Persons Entitled Thereto), § 558 ("In the Service
of the Ship"), § 560 (Extent of the Obligation), § 576 (Failure to Pay). See also 13 VnL. L. REV. 187 (1967); Annot.,
3 A.L.R.3rd 1082 (1965); 13 A.L.R.2nd 628 (1950).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol6/iss3/3

2

Jones: Personal Injury: Some Admiralty Rules Applicable in Oklahoma

19701

ADMIRALTY RULES

faring times. 5 Maintenance and cure is not, and never was,
however, an award of compensation for disability or damages
suffered,6 but is merely a means of providing a seaman relief
by affording him medical care7 and treatment and reimbursing him for the cost of maintaining himself during convalescence.
Maintenance and cure which the master owes the mariner is generally thought to arise impliedly out of the nature
of the employment, vesting a right in the mariner while imposing a corresponding duty on both the vessel and the shipowner.8 It is immaterial that the shipowner is free from negligence and that the ship is completely seaworthy. Furthermore, the right to maintenance and cure cannot be contracted away by the seaman.'0 All the injured or sick seaman need
show in order to recover maintenance and cure is that he was
a member of the crew, that he became ill or was injured while
in the service of the ship, and that he was not wilfully negli5 See 1 M. Nomus, supra note 3, § § 538, 539 for a comprehensive presentation of the doctrine of maintenance and cure
as it existed in the earliest sea codes.
6 United Fruit Co. v. Sumrall, 273 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1960);
Schybinger v. Interlake S.S. Co., 273 F.2d 307 (7th Cir.
(1959); The Wanderer, 20 F. 140 (C.C.E.D. La. 1884); Theall
v. Sam Carline, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 748 (W.D. La. 1963).
7 The word "cure" has not been given a literal interpretation
by the courts as a complete cure may, in fact, be impossible. Such a duty on the shipowner would, in many cases,
be unbearable. See Calmer S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S.
525 (1938); Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 F.2d 690 (3rd Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 577 (1941).
8 Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943); De Zon v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660 (1943); Jones
v. Waterman S.S. Co., 155 F.2d 992 (3rd Cir. 1946).
9 United Fruit Co. v. Sumrall, 273 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1960);
Musgrave v. Bronx Towing Line, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 918
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Stone v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 182
F. Supp. 200 (D. Md. 1960).
10 Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943); De Zon v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660 (1943).
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gent. If these three elements are present, the vessel and its
owner are absolutely liable for maintenance and cure. The
historical basis underlying what at first glance may seem to
be an unduly strict liability was ably stated by Justice Rutlege
in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Company."
From the earliest times, maritime nations have recognized that unique hazards, emphasized by unusual
tenure and control, attend the work of seamen. The
physical risks created by natural elements, and the
limitations of human adaptability to work at sea, enlarge the narrower and more strictly occupational
hazards of sailing and operating vessels. And the restrictions which accompany living aboard ship for
long periods at a time combine with the constant
shuttling between unfamiliar ports to deprive the seaman of the comforts and opportunities for leisure,
essential for living and working, that accompany most
land occupations. Furthermore, the seaman's unusual
subjection to authority adds the weight of what would
be involuntary servitude for others to these extraordinary hazards and limitations of ship life.
Accordingly, with the combined object of encouraging marine commerce and assuring the well-being of
seamen, maritime nations uniformly have imposed
broad responsibilities for their health and safety upon
the owners of ships. In this country these notions were
reflected early, and have since been expanded, in legislation designed to secure the comfort and health of
seamen aboard ship, hospitalization at home and care
abroad. The statutes are uniform in evincing solicitude
that the seaman shall have at hand the barest essentials for existence. They do this two ways. One is
by recognizing the shipowner's duty to supply them,
the other by providing care at public expense. The
former do not create the duty. That existed long before the statutes were adopted. They merely recognize the pre-existing obligation and put specific legal
sanctions, generally criminal, behind it.12
n 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
Id. at 727 (the Court's citation and footnotes are omitted
and emphasis is added). The Court further set out, very

12
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Seaworthiness
Apart from the concept of maintenance and cure, there
developed the doctrine of seaworthiness (or unseaworthiness,
as the case may be). Under this doctrine, the seaman is not
limited to maintenance (food, lodging, wages) and cure (medical care, hospitalization) but ".. . may recover full indemnity,
i.e., compensatory damages."' 3 In The Osceola, 14 the Supreme
Court affirmed the proposition.
2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English
and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries
received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in
order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.
It will be observed in these cases that a departure has
been made from the Continental codes in allowing an
indemnity beyond the expense of maintenance and
cure in cases arising from unseaworthiness. 15
succinctly, the elements of maintenance and cure.
In the United States this obligation [maintenance and
cure] has been recognized consistently as an implied
provision in contracts of maritime employment. Created
thus with the contract of employment, the liability, unlike
that for indemnity or that later created by the Jones Act,
in no sense is predicated on the fault or negligence of
the shipowner. Whether by traditional standards he is
or is not responsible for the injury or sickness, he is liable for the expense of curing it as an incident of the
maritime employer-employee relationship. So broad is the
shipowner's obligation, that negligence or acts short of
culpable misconduct on the seaman's part will not relieve
him of the responsibility. Conceptions of contributory
negligence, the fellow-servant doctrine, and assumption
of risk have no place in the liability or defense against
it. Id. at 730 (Court's citation and footnotes omitted).
13 1 E. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADmRn aLTY § 83, at 256 (6th ed.
1940).
14 189 U.S. 158 (1903).

15 Id. at 175 (Court's citation omitted).
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Therefore, where the ship (or any part thereof) is found to
be unseaworthy, 6 an injured seaman may recover actual
wages lost, pain and suffering, impairment of future earning
capacity, medical expenses, and future physical pain and suffering if reasonably probable. 7
The doctrine of seaworthiness is not as old as the concept
of maintenance and cure but the reasons for its birth and
8 were
development, as summarized in The State of Maryland,1
similar.
Seamen are the wards of admiralty, and the policy of
maritime law has ever been to see that they are accorded proper protection by the vessels on which they
serve. In early days, this protection was sufficiently
accorded by the enforcement of the right of "maintenance and cure." Vessels and their appliances were
of comparatively simple construction, and seamen
were in quite as good position ordinarily to judge
of the seaworthiness of the vessel as were her owners ....
With the advent of steam navigation, however, it
was realized, at least in this country, that "maintenance and cure" did not afford to injured seamen
adequate compensation in all cases for injuries sustained. Vessels were no longer the simple sailing ships,
of whose seaworthiness the sailor was an adequate
judge, but were full of complicated and dangerous
machinery, the operation of which required the use of
many and varied appliances and a high degree of
technical knowledge. The seaworthiness of the vessel
could be ascertained only upon an examination of this
machinery and appliances by skilled experts. It was
accordingly held that the duty of the vessel and her
16 See M. NoRIms, MuamnM PEasoNAL INJURI
§ 54 (2d ed.
1966) for a collection of cases illustrating what the courts
have found the term "unseaworthy" to embrace. See also
Grundman, Unseaworthinzess and Personal Injuries Ashore,
17 CLEV.-MAR. L. Ray. 481 (1968).
17 M. Norius, supra note 16, § 53.
18 85 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1936).
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owners to the seaman, in this new age of navigation,
extended beyond mere "maintenance and cure," which
had been sufficient in the simple age of sailing ships;
that the owners owed to the seamen the duty of furnishing a seaworthy vessel and safe and proper appliances in good order and condition.... [The court
here referring to The Osceola.]'9
The seaworthiness concept was recognized very early either
20
expressly or impliedly in several federal district court cases
and was first laid down by the Supreme Court in The Osceola.2 1 The "gist" of the doctrine is simply this: "Seaworthiness
is a relative concept, 22 depending in each instance on the
particular circumstances. The owner owes an absolute duty
to provide a seaworthy vessel; however the absolute duty is
only to furnish a vessel and equipment reasonably fit for
10

20

Id. at 945 (emphasis added). See also The H.A. Scandrett,
87 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1937) ("A ship is an instrumentality
full of internal hazards aggravated, if not created, by the
uses to which she is put.").
The A. Heaton, 43 F. 592 (C.C. Mass. 1890) (shipowners'
failure to provide proper equipment results in liability for
ensuing injuries; but the Court does not distinguish between negligence and unseaworthiness); The Julia Fowler,
49 F. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1892) (seaman allowed recovery for
injuries sustained when rope broke causing him to fall);
The Frank and Willie, 45 F. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1891) (negligence
of mate in not providing means of unloading cargo safely
results in liability for unseaworthiness); Olson v. Flavel 34
F. 477 (D. Ore. 1888) (shipowner liable for failure to provide safe equipment). See also Dixon v. United States, 219

F.2d 10 (2d. Cir. 1955); G. Gniwopx & C. BLACK, THE LAWOF ADMALTY, at 315 (1957); Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthi-

ness and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CoR-EII L.Q.
381, 386 (1954) for a more thorough historical discussion.

21 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
22

"It [seaworthiness] is relative in the sense that a vessel
may be said to be fit for certain purposes and unfit for
others." M. Noams, A tnwE PRSONAL INJuRES § 33, at
66 (2d ed. 1966). For a recent example of the "relative concept" idea see Walker v. Harris, 335 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1964),
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their intended use." 23 The Supreme Court has stated: "It
[the shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness] is essentially
a species of liability without fault.... [T]he liability is neither
limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character. It is a form of absolute duty owing to all within the
range of its humanitarian policy. 24 If unseaworthiness is
found and personal injury results as a proximate result thereof, the shipowner is not relieved of his obligation no matter
how diligent and careful he has been 25 and regardless of the
fact that he has relinquished control of part of the ship to
someone else.26 Closely allied with the absolute duty concept

cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964) where an ocean going tug
sank in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Florida during
an unanticipated "norther" with winds of "moderate gale"
strength 33-36 m.p.h. and "very rough" seas (waves 5' to
12' in height). The Court held, at 194, the ship and lifeboat
unseaworthy as a matter of law: "The Tug therefore had
to have the capabilities of withstanding winds and seas of
that expected power which might arise. . .

."

It follows

that if the storm had been more severe and/or extraordinary for that time of year, the vessel would not have been
"unseaworthy." See also Compania de Navegacion v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 66 (1928).
2s Gibbs v. Kiesel, 382 F.2d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 1967)
(emphasis
added).
24 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94 (1946). This
case is most cited for its extension of maritime rules to more
persons than the immediate crew of the vessel. See also
Hussein v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1968);
Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 620 (1962); 77 A.L.R.2d 829 (1961).
25 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Van
Carpals v. The S.S. Am. Harvester, 297 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1961).
26 Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). The older
cases had provided some authority that the duty to furnish
a seaworthy vessel and equipment was imposed upon the
shipowner exclusively by virtue of the implied warranty
in the employment contract between shipowner and seaman.
Cf. Hamilton v. United States, 268 F. 15 (4th Cir. 1920);
Rainey v. New York & Pac. S.S. Co., 216 F. 449 (9th Cir.
1914).
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of unseaworthiness is the rule that the duty is nondelegable.2
The most noted of the recent cases in this area is Mitchell v.
Trawler Racer, Inc.,28 which extended the doctrine of seaworthiness to apply to temporary unseaworthy conditions
which arise after the vessel leaves its home port as well as
to those which are permanent and exist prior to departure. 29
Statiutory Provisions
A third avenue for recovery open to an injured seaman
is provided by statute.2 0 Only by virtue of the statutes has
the mariner been able to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of the master or of a fel-2 The H.A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937); Christopher
v. Grueby, 40 F.2d 8 (lst Cir. 1930). This rule paved the
way for the holding in Sieracki.
28 362 U.S. 539 (1960). Prior to Mitchell, there was some authority to the effect that the temporary presence of an injury causing substance, arising after commencement of the
voyage, on the ship's deck or stairway does not render the
ship unseaworthy. This reasoning was based on the theory
that the shipowner had no knowledge of, or control over,
such transitory defects arising after the vessel put to sea.
Cf. Cookingham v. United States, 184 F.2d 213 (3rd Cir.
1950). See also Hamilton v. United States, 268 F. 15 (4th
Cir. 1920) for the possible effect of the Harter Act [46
U.S.C. § 190 (1964)] on the court's reasoning in personal
injury matters. That act relieved the shipowner of strict
liability for cargo damage caused by negligence of master
or crew during the voyage, so long as the shipowner used
due diligence in providing a seaworthy ship or in manning
her.
29 The way was paved for Mitchell by Boudoin v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) and Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), which seriously undermined the
"transitory condition" exception to unseaworthiness. Boudoin held that the mere fact that the shipowner has no
knowledge of the defect and no opportunity to correct same
would not relieve him of liability for unseaworthiness.
30 See 2 M. NoRais, THE LAw OF SEAbMN § § 654-656 (2d ed.
1962) for a brief survey of statutory enactments in the
United States.
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low seaman.8 1 The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (The Jones
Act)3 2 gives the injured seaman an in personam action at law
for damages against his employer in addition to the heretofore mentioned remedies available to him under admiralty
law.38 The statute will in some instances overlap the doctrines
of maintenance and cure and seaworthiness, enabling the injured seaman to seek recovery under a combination of the
three remedies.3 4 Additional statutory material is considered
in Part III following.
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903) ("4. That the seaman
is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence
of the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled
to maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were received from negligence or accident."). Note that this decision was handed down seventeen (17) years prior to passsage of the Jones Act.
32 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). This act was upheld as constitutional
by Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924). The Act
provides, in part as follows:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment may, at his election, maintain
an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by
jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy
in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall
apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such
action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such
actions shall be under the court of the district in which
the defendant employer resides or in which his principal
office is located.
11 Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928); The H.A.
Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).
34 See 1 E. BEmcT, supra note 13, § 25 for a more exhaustive
treatment of the statutory material. In addition, there are
a number of other statutes and regulations pertaining to
31
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PART II
The foregoing material has presented the high points of
the three basic remedies available to an injured mariner: maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, and the Jones Act. Part
II of this article will be devoted to some unusual concepts
inherent in these three remedies which will confront Oklahoma courts upon the completion of the Arkansas River Navigation Project. Injured and ill seamen will be seeking recovery under the remedies discussed above. What are some of
the rules applicable to these remedies with which Oklahoma
courts may not be familiar?
Assumption of Risk
The concept that the seaman is barred from recovery because he has assumed the risk of his voluntary employment is
not recognized as a defense in a suit for maintenance and
cure,8 5 unseaworthiness, 36 or under the Jones Act.V87 With regard to maintenance and cure, the United States Supreme
Court in Aguilar said, "So broad is the shipowner's obligation,
that negligence ... on the seaman's part will not relieve him
[the shipowner] of the responsibility. Conceptions of contributory negligence, the fellow-servant doctrine, and assumption
ship safety and inspection. For example, see 46 C.F.R. §§
113, 114, 119 (1939), Coast Guard regulations which set out
detailed equipment which river vessels must provide. See
also Carrere, An Act Named Jones, 15 LA. B.J. 95 (1967).
8i Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943), Couts v.
Erickson, 241 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1957).
36 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939) as
applied by Hildebrand v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 514
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), affd, 226 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1955); Nicroli
v. Den Norske Afrika-Og Australielinie, 332 F.2d 651 (2d
Cir. 1964); Ballwanz v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 319 F.2d 457
(4th Cir. 1963).
87 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939); The
Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936); Green v. Orion
Shipping & Trading Co., 139 F. Supp. 431 (D. Md. 1956).'
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of risk have no place in the liability or defense against it.18 8
In Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Company,0 the Supreme
Court stated by way of dictum as to unseaworthiness: "Whether petitioner knew of the defective condition of the rope does
not appear, but in any case the seaman, in the performance
of his duties, is not deemed to assume the risk of unseaworthy
appliances." 40 Previously, the Supreme Court had held, in a
case involving the issue of whether assumption of risk would
bar recovery by an injured seaman under the Jones Act: "Any
rule of assumption of risk in admiralty, whatever its scope,
must be applied in conjunction with the established admiralty
doctrine of comparative negligence ... ."41 "We think that the
. .responsibility of owners for the seaworthiness of vessels
and the safety of their appliances will be best served by
applying the rule of comparative negligence, rather than that
of assumption of risk .... ,,42
*

It has long been the rule in Oklahoma that an employee,
voluntarily entering into an employment contract, assumes
all the risks ordinarily incident to his employment and the
risks which may arise from obvious defects in the work place

38

89
40

41

42

318 U.S. at 730. The quoted language as to assumption of
risk is probably dicta, since this case involved the question
of whether or not the injured seaman was "in the service
of his ship."
321 U.S. 96 (1944).
Id at 103. This language, although dicta, was adopted in
the cases cited in note 36 supra. In particular, in Ballwanz
v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 319 F.2d 457, 462 (4th Cir. 1963),
the court said: "If the doctrine of seaworthiness means anything, it is totally repugnant to the doctrine of assumption
of risk on the part of seamen."
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939).
See also DuBose v. Matson Navigation Co., 403 F.2d 875 (9th
Cir. 1968).
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 432 (1939).
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or equipment.43 This includes extraordinary risks incident to
the employment which arise from the employer's negligence
and of which the employee had, or should have had, knowledge. 44 But the servant does not assume the risks inherent in
unusual hidden defects caused by the employer's negligence.4 5
Furthermore, where an employer violates a safety statute,
the defense of assumption of risk is not available to him even
though the employee may know of such violation. 4 6 With
the passage of Oklahoma's Workmen's Compensation Act,47
however, assumption of risk lost much of its force as the Act
expressly abolishes assumption of risk as a defense where the
Act is applicable. It should be noted, however, that, with one
possible exception, seamen are not covered by the Act.48
It is readily apparent that although assumption of risk
43

Osage Coal & Mining Co. v. Sperra, 42 Okla. 726, 142 P. 1040
(1914) ; Coalgate Co. v. Hurst, 25 Okla. 588, 107 P. 657 (1910),
petition for cert. dismissed, 225 U.S. 697 (1912). San Bois
Coal Co. v. Janeway, 22 Okla. 425, 99 P. 153 (1908). See
generally, Symposium on the Law of Torts, 19 OKLA. L.
REv. 305-357 (1966).

H.F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Jamison, 199 Okla. 691, 190
P.2d 807 (1948); Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. v. Costa, 69 Okla.
132, 170 P. 892 (1918). But the employee must use reasonable care and prudence to discover obvious defects: Coalgate Co. v. Hurst, 25 Okla. 588, 107 P. 657 (1910), petition
for cert. dismissed, 225 U.S. 697 (1912).
45 Haynie v. Haynie, 426 P.2d 717 (Okla. 1966); Donahoe v.
Moulton, 300 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1956); Oklahoma Natural Gas
Co. v. Walker, 269 P.2d 327 (Okla. 1953); Midland Valley
R.R. v. Cox, 69 Okla. 123, 170 P. 485 (1916).
46 Connelly v. Jennings, 207 Okla. 554, 252 P.2d 133 (1952);
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 921 (1953); Bartlesville Zinc Co. v.
James, 66 Okla. 24, 166 P. 1054 (1917); Harris Irby Cotton
Co. v. Duncan, 57 Okla. 761, 157 P. 746 (1915).
47 OKLA. STAT. tit. 85 § 2-176 (1954), as amended. See text
material on Part III infra.
48 OKLA. STAT. tit. 85 § 2 (Supp. 1968). Note that the Act does
44

apply to employees engaged in the "hazardous employment"

of working on dredges. This is the exception referred to
in the text preceeding this note.
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would ordinarily preclude recovery in negligence cases (other
than workmen's compensation matters) litigated in Oklahoma an attempted application of the doctrine to the case
of an injured seaman would run afoul of this traditional
Admiralty remedies where assumption of risk is not a
recognized defense. This seeming conflict is resolved in
favor of the admiralty rules. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Company49 is considered as authority for the proposition that
state courts must apply the admiralty doctrine in lieu of their
own common law rules.60 The Supreme Court stated in Garrett:
"... [S]tate courts may not apply their doctrines of assumption
of risk in actions arising under the Act."'r, It goes without saying that federal courts sitting in Oklahoma will, in applyng
the substantive law of Oklahoma (where the cause of action
arose), apply the appropriate admiralty rules or the Jones
Act, as the case may be, since that will be the substantive law
Oklahoma courts would apply.
Contributory and Comparative Negligence
Although the defense of assumption of risk is not available
to the shipowner in admiralty or in law under the Jones Act,
the concept of comparative negligence (or proportionate fault)
may be a defense in suits brought for recovery under the doctrine of unseaworthiness or under the Jones Act, not as an
49

317 U.S. 239 (1942).

NoRRIs, MI ITImE PERSONAL INJUREs, § 44, at 97
(2d ed. 1966).
5'317 U.S. at 244. Although the Court was declaring a ban
on imposition of state assumption of risk rules in actions
brought under the Jones Act, the writer agrees with Mr.
Norris, supra note 50, that the prohibition likewise extends
to suits brought for maintenance and cure and for recovery
under unseaworthiness. Otherwise, there could, in effect,
be no recovery for maintenance and cure and no recovery
under unseaworthiness in actions brought in state courts
where the shipowner was not negligent. See the text material under Contributory and Comparative Negligence and
the material contained in note 59 infra for additional comments on this point.
50 See M.
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absolute bar to recovery but only in mitigation of damages. 5 2
Contributory negligence is not a defense either in admiralty
suits for unseaworthiness or under the Jones Act except in
mitigation of damages. 53 Therefore, when the seaman is suing
under either unseaworthiness or the Jones Act, he will be
denied recovery to the extent his own negligence contributed
to his injury. The proportion of the libellant's fault is applied
to, and a deduction made from, the total damages awardedY5
On the other hand, it is well settled in personal injury
cases litigated in Oklahoma courts, that if the one seeking recovery was contributorily negligent in the slightest degree, he
is absolutely barred from recovery.55 Furthermore, as a corolUnseaworthiness: Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360
F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1966); Bryant v. Partenreederei-Ernest
Russ, 352 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1965); Nicroli v. Den Norske
Afrika-Og Australielinie, 332 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1964); Santomarco v. United States, 277 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1960). Jones
Act: Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939);
Tuttle v. American Oil Co., 292 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1961);
Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d 618
(2d Cir. 1954); Mitchell v. Reading & Bates Exploration Co.,
239 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Tex. 1965).
03 Unseaworthiness: United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots
Ass'n. v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Skibinski v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 360 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1966). Jones Act: Jacob v. New
York City, 315 U.S. 752 (1942); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v.
Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939); DuBose v. Matson Navigation
Co., 403 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1968); Ammar v. American Export Lines, Inc., 326 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1964).
54 See Pisano v. The S.S. Benny Skou, 220 F. Supp. 9 0 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd., 346 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1965) where
the injured seaman was found to be 100% negligent and
therefore was denied any recovery.
55 F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Davis, 41 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1930),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 859 (1930); Rader v. Fleming, 429
P.2d 750 (Okla. 1967); Barbe v. Barbe, 378 P.2d 314 (Okla.
1962); Thorp v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 73 Okla. 123, 175 P. 240
(1918). See generally Symposium on the Law of Torts, 19
OKLA. L. REV. 305-357 (1966). Note however that, as was

52
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lary to that rule, the doctine of comparative negligence is not
recognized in Oklahoma.5" In other words, as to these points
Oklahoma law is in complete opposition to the corresponding
admiralty rules applicable to unseaworthiness and to the federal rules regarding negligence under the Jones Act. But again
Oklahoma law must yield to federal maritime law when
Oklahoma courts entertain seamen's injury cases. In Beadle v.
Spender,57 the question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether California's common law or the traditional
admiralty rules would apply in a case of a seaman's injury. The
Court stated that "The rules, peculiar to admiralty, of liability
for injuries to seamen or others, are as applicable when the
injury occurs upon a vessel in port as when at sea, although
the common law may apply a different rule to an injury similarly inflicted on the wharf to which the vessel is moored." 58
Garrett,mentioned above concerning assumption of risk, also
discussed the applicability of admiralty rules of contributory
and comparative negligence:
This Court has specifically held that the Jones Act is
to have a uniform application throughout the country,
unaffected by 'local views of common law rules.'
the case with assumption of risk, Oklahoma's Workmen's
Compensation Act, where applicable, has expressly abolished the defense of contributory negligence. But with possibly one exception, the Act is not now applicable to seamen's
injuries. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § § 2, 12 (1954). See the text
material in Part III following.
56 Rader v. Fleming, 429 P.2d 750 (Okla. 1967); Barbe v. Barbe,
378 P.2d 314 (Okla. 1962); Public Serv. Co. v. Sanders, 362
P.2d 90 (Okla. 1961); Mount v. Nichols, 198 Okla. 282, 177
P.2d 1013 (1947); Gourley v. Oklahoma City, 104 Okla. 210,
230 P. 923 (1924).
5

58

298 U.S. 124 (1936).

Id. at 129 (Court's citations omitted). This is probably dicta
as to contributory negligence since the principal question
on appeal concerned the trial court's instructions regarding
assumption of risk.
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In many other cases this Court has declared the neccessary dominance of admiralty principles in actions
in vindication of rights arising from admiralty law.
It must be remembered that the state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to try
actions either under the Merchant Marine Act or in
personam such as maintenance and cure. The source
of the governing law applied is the national, not the
state, government. If by its practice the state courts
were permitted substantially to alter the rights of
either litigant, as those rights were established in federal law, the remedy afforded by the State would
not enforce, but would actually deny, federal
rights ....
59
59 317 U.S. at 244 (Court's quotations and citations omitted).
Although this case involved a suit for maintenance and
cure and for recovery under the Jones Act and not specifically under unseaworthiness, Norris cites this case as also being applicable to suits for unseaworthiness: M. NoRRus,
MArrnvm PEaSoNAL INjulms § 44, at 97 (2d ed. 1966). It
is submitted that this is correct in view of the Court's reference to the general "admiralty law" and "admiralty principles" and the fact that the holding is squarely applicable
to maintenance and cure. It would be anomolous for state
courts to be forbidden from applying their own rules as
to maintenance and cure while at the same time being permitted to do so as to unseaworthiness. Accord, Halecki v.
United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n., 251 F.2d 708,
713 (2d Cir. 1958). (The Halecki court, relying on Garrett
and on Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) said:
"[R]ights arising from faults that occur in navigable waters
are exclusively the creation of maritime law, and are exempt from the defense of contributory negligence whether
suit upon it is in the admiralty or in an action at law, state
or federal.") (emphasis added). Here plaintiff had sued in
a federal court in New Jersey under the doctrine of unseaworthiness and for negligence. Held: The New Jersey
Death Statute (N.J.S.A. 2A: 31-1) under which contributory
negligence was a complete bar, was inapplicable. But see
Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893).
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The Supreme Court concluded:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has concluded that
in solving problems of procedural, as distinguished
from substantive, law, the law court may apply its
own doctrine ....
Much of what we have said above concerning the necessity of preserving all of the substantial admiralty
rights in an action at law is incompatible with the
conclusion of the court below. 0
In actions for maintenance and cure, state courts must also
apply the admiralty rules in lieu of their own common law.6 '
Therefore, the Oklahoma rule barring recovery when contributory negligence is present will be inapplicable in state
courts in this area. So long as the seaman did not bring on
iis injury or illness by his own wilful conduct, he may recover
naintenance and cure in Oklahoma courts, no matter how
negligent he was. Federal courts sitting in Oklahoma will, of
mourse, also apply the appropriate admiralty or federal law.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Federal courts, in particular the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, have from time to time spoken in terms
of res ipsa loquitur.62 One of the most recent cases was Gibbs
v. KieseV which involved an action for injuries caused by an
unseaworthy vessel. The court said:
This Court has specifically approved the application
of res ipsa loquitur reasoning to an action for unseaworthiness, noting that the logical inference is
often that the gear or appurtenance would not have
broken had it not been defective.6
60 317 U.S. at 248.
61 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903); Paul v. United States, 205
F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1953); Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Fallon,
179 F. 293 (2d Cir. 1909); The City of St. Louis, 56 F. 720
(E.D. La. 1893); The Ben Flint, 3 F. Cas. 183 (No. 1299)
(D. Wis. 1967).
62 See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.3rd 642 (1965).
6 382 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1967).
6 Id. at 919.
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By way of footnote the Court added:
But note that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in
admiralty cases is only similar to the doctrine in ordinary tort law. One distinction is that res ipsa loquitur
in tort law requires that the accident be one that would
not ordinarily occur without negligence. The negligence concept plays no part in unseaworthiness. .... 65
The prior case of Walker v. Harris66 also discussed this concept:
... [S]inking (or other failure) under circumstances
and conditions which the vessel must reasonably anticipate and overcome is the best proof of, and makes
out the classic case of, unseaworthiness. Although
not articulated in such terms, it is a sort of sea-going
res ipsa loquitur. Once it is assumed (or judicially
held) that the vessel must anticipate the particular
hazard and be staunch enough to override it, the only
escape from the inference of unseaworthiness is proof
that some new, unforeseen, intervening force or factor
brought about the failure of ship or gear.6 7
The traditional land oriented doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
said to involve the following elements: "(1) The event must
be of a kind which does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it
61 Id. Here the court was referring to Van Carpals v. The S.S.
Am. Harvester, 297 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1961) which also
discussed this concept: "That doctrine [res ipsa loquitur]
may be applicable in ship cases . . .but here resort to it
as normally conceived is not necessary. For it is customary
to state certain requirements for or limitations upon the
application of res ipsa loquitur . . .which have no place
(or are automatically supplied) in the absolute duty of the
shipowner (quite apart from theories of negligence) to provide a seaworthy ship." Van Carpals v. The S.S. Am. Harvester, supra, at 11.
66 335 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964).
67 Id. at 193. See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46
(1948) for a discussion by the United States Supreme Court
of the applicability of the doctrine to Jones Act cases.
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must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. '6 8 This doctrine, in the form
set out above, is recognized in Oklahoma,6 9 but an examination
of the cases will reveal that the rule is generally not applicable
as between master and servant.7 0 Ordinarily, the mere fact that
the employee is injured during the course of his employment
will not give rise to a presumption of the employer's negligence. The employee must affirmatively show negligence of
the employer in order to recover.7 1 The primary reason for
the inapplicability of the rule as between employee and his
employer is the difficulty of showing the second element above,
i.e. that the control of the instrumentality causing the injury
was exclusively in the defendant-employer. Likewise, it may
be difficult for plaintiff-employee to negate the possibility of
his own contributory negligence, especially if his injury is
caused by machinery or tools with which he is working. Res
68 W.

69

70

71

PRossER, HADBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §

39, at 218

(3rd ed. 1964). See also F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 77, at 182 (1940) where it states: "But negligence
may be shown by circumstantial evidence. If the facts and
circumstances relied upon to sustain the allegation of negligence are closely and immediately connected with the accident there is said to arise a presumption of negligence
which is described as a case in which res ipsa loquitur. In
such a case, all that is necessary for the plaintiff to do is
to prove the fact of the harm and the circumstances under
which it occurred."
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lukken, 372 F.2d 8 (10th Cir.
1967); J.C. Penny Co. v. Eubanks, 294 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.
1961); Duncan v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Okla.
1951); Smith v. Vanier, 307 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1957).
Sanders v. McMichael, 200 Okla. 501, 197 P.2d 280 (1948);
Missouri Okla. & Gulf Ry. v. West, 50 Okla. 521, 151 P. 212
(1915); Smith v. Acme Milling Co., 34 Okla. 439, 126 P. 190
(1912).
Speed v. Whalin, 386 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1963); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Skeen, 207 Okla. 180, 248 P.2d 582 (1952); Wright
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 170 Okla. 48, 38 P.2d 517 (1934);
Grand v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 97 Okla. 111, 221
P.80 (1924).
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ipsa loquitur has been traditionally applied in Oklahoma to
actions brought to recover damages for injuries incurred by
eating or drinking food or liquids defectively or impurely packaged"2 and for certain injuries sustained by members of the
public in public or private places.73 Furthermore, it is recognized in Oklahoma that res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence
only which, when applicable, gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of negligence, there being no concept of liability
without fault involved in the doctrine. 74
It would appear then, that the time honored doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, as applied to certain negligence cases arising
on land, would be completely superfluous to the basic concepts of absolute liability underlying the admiralty rules of
maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness which involve no
conceptions of negligence. As to suits brought under the Zones
Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dillard, 208 Okla. 126,
253 P.2d 847 (1953); Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.,
Newton, 205 Okla. 360, 237 P.2d 627 (1951).
73 See Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 403 P.2d 507 (Okla.
1965) (pollution of plaintiff's land, water well, and pond
by defendant's drilling operations); Transcontinental Bus
Sys., Inc. v. Simons, 367 P.2d 160 (Okla. 1961) (plaintiffpassenger injured when door to luggage compartment of
defendant's bus fell on plaintiff's head); Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co. v. Colvert, 260 P.2d 1076 (Okla. 1953) (fire damage
to plaintiff's home resulting from excessive gas pressure
caused by defective regulator in defendant's gas line); Terrell v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 204 Okla. 24, 226 P.2d
431 (1950) (defective door on defendant's bank injured
plaintiff); Keefer v. Public Serv. Co., 185 Okla. 94, 90 P.2d
409 (1939) (plaintiff's decedent injured by defendant's
downed wire); J.C. Penny Co. v. Forrest, 183 Okla. 106, 80
P.2d 640 (1938) (defective machinery in defendant's store
injured plaintiff-customer).
74 Downs v. Longfellow Corp., 351 P.2d 999 (Okla. 1960); Laffoon Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 330 P.2d 194 (Okla. 1958); Smith
v. Vanier, 307 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1957); Keefer v. Public Serv.
Co., 185 Okla. 94, 90 P.2d 409 (1939); Carter Oil Co. v. Independent Torpedo Co., 107 Okla. 209, 232 P. 419 (1924).
72
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Act, where the seaman must plead and prove negligence, the
doctrine would also be inapplicable in most instances since it
is generally not available to an employee as against his employer for injuries arising out of the employment. The only
conceivable situation where the doctrine might be applicable
is in an action brought under the Jones Act by a longshoreman
who is not an employee of the shipowner.7 5 It is submitted
that federal courts in using the term "res ipsa loquitur," in
actions by seaman-employee against shipowner-employer, have
done so loosely and incorrectly especially in actions based on
the doctrine of unseaworthiness which does not include the
element of negligence. The most that can be said for the applicability of the doctrine in maritime cases is that the rule,
in some hybrid form, may be applied to raise a presumption
of unseaworthiness.7 6
PART III
The Applicability of Admiralty to Oklahoma
At this point the reader may well be thinking: "All this
is well and good, but surely rules of admiralty, traditionally
applicable to ocean-going clipper ships of the past as well as
today's luxury liners and cargo ships, will not be equally
relevant in matters involving small inland tugs and barges
operating on the Arkansas River and its tributaries." But the
general maritime law will apply at the Port of Catoosa at
Tulsa much as it would apply in mid-ocean.
The United States Constitution originally placed admiralty
jurisdiction in the federal judiciary.77 Later, by statute and
Supreme Court decision, admiralty jurisdiction was extended
71

See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) which
extended the jurisdiction of admiralty to certain longshoremen.

See Walker v. Harris, 335 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1964) as discussed in the text of this article in conjunction with note
66 supra.
7 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.

76
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to all navigable waterways . Very early the Supreme Court
held a man-made canal to be a navigable waterway subject to
79
federal admiralty jurisdiction.
Navigable water situated as this canal is, used for the
purposes for which it is used, a highway for commerce
between ports and places in different States, carried
on by vessels such as those in question here, is public
water of the United States, and within the legitimate
scope of the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, even
though the canal is wholly artificial, and is wholly
within the body of a State, and subject to its ownership and control; and it makes no difference as to the
jurisdiction of the district court that one or the other
of the vessels was at the time of the collision on a
voyage from one place in the State of Illinois to another place in that State.80
Furthermore, it is not necessary that the "vessel" in question
be an ocean-going ship in the traditional sense.81 The Supreme
The Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726 extended admiralty jurisdiction, as conferred by the Constitution (see
note 77 supra), to the Great Lakes and connecting waters.
The Supreme Court held in Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1957) and in The Hine v.
Trever, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 555 (1866) that federal district
courts could exercise jurisdiction over admiralty cases
arising on navigable waters under authority of the Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76. The Act of 1845 was
therefore bypassed and as it was deemed superfluous, it
was later repealed (Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6 § 28, 36 Stat.
104); see note 103 infra for a historical survey of Congressional action in the area of admiralty jurisdiction.
70 Ex Parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884).
80 Id. at 632. See also Davis v. United States, 185 F.2d 938 (9th
Cir. 1950); Annot., 17 Ann. Cas. 349 (1910).
81 See Charles Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat, 169 F. 895 (E.D.
Ky. 1909) for a discussion of what is and what is not a
"vessel." The district court said: "So frequently navigable
structures intended for transportation have been held to
be vessels, though without means of propulsion aboard and
yet not propelled by the wind." Charles Barnes Co. v. One
Dredge Boat, supra at 896 (emphasis added).
78
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Court held long ago, in The Robert W. Parsons,82 that a
canal-boat is a "vessel" within admiralty jurisdiction. Congress
also has spoken in this area, defining a "vessel" subject to
admiralty jurisdiction as ". . . All water craft and other artificial contrivances of whatever description and at whatever
stage of construction . ..

which are used or are capable of

being or are intended to be used as a means of transportation
on water."83
There is no clear-cut definition of exactly who is a "seaman" within admiralty jurisdiction. However, it is clear, from
an examination of the cases, that the term is not limited to
the traditional mariner on the high seas. 4 In Nelson v. Greene
Line Steamers, Inc.,8 5 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
succinctly stated the three elements of a "seaman." "[Tihe
test to be applied in determining whether an employee is a
'seaman' within the meaning of the [Jones] Act is (1) that
the vessel be in navigation, (2) that there be more or less
permanent connection with the vessel, and (3) that the worker be aboard primarily to aid in navigation. This is a matter
depending largely upon the facts of the particular case."8 6
In this case the worker in question, a deckhand and carpenter's helper on a Mississippi River excursion boat, was held
191 U.S. 17 (1903).
8 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1964).
s4 See generally M. NoRRms, MAMTnE PERSONAL INJURIES H§
§ 1,
82

51 (2nd ed. 1966); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1312 (1961).
sr 255 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 867 (1958).
86 Id. at 33 (court's citations omitted). As to what constitutes
"aiding in navigation," the Sixth Circuit had previously
said: "A review of the cases supports our conclusion that
'aiding in navigation' is not confined to those who can
'hand, reef and steer,' but applies to all whose duties contribute to the operation and welfare of the vessel." Wilkes
v. Mississippi River Sand & Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383, 388
(6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 817 (1953). See also
Bodden v. Coordinated Caribbean Transp., Inc., 369 F.2d
273 (5th Cir. 1966), for an almost identical wording, by
the Fifth Circuit, of the elements of a "seaman."
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not to be a "seaman" because the first element was not present, that is, the vessel was not in navigation.87 It appears that
this is the most important consideration. If the ship is "in
navigation" at the time the injury is incurred, federal courts
will tend to hold any injured worker to be a "seaman."8 8 As
The Fifth Circuit once stated: "As a result of the cases, we
feel constrained to hold that one who does any sort of work
aboard a ship in navigation is a 'seaman' within the meaning
of the Jones Act."8' 9
Also, the mere fact that the "voyage" is of short duration
and distance is not controlling in all instances. 90 As was held
in Weiss v. Central Railroad Company: 91
We know of no authority, however, for holding that
a seaman is not entitled to the traditional privileges
of his status merely because his voyages are short, because he sleeps ashore, or for other reasons his lot is
more pleasant than that of most of his brethren. FurthAs to when a ship is "in navigation," the Fifth Circuit
stated: "The nautical phrase, 'plying in navigable waters'
does not mean that the vessel must, at the very moment
of the injury, have been actually in motion on navigable
waters." McKie v. Diamond Marine Co., 204 F.2d 132, 134
(5th Cir. 1953).
8 Magnolia Towing Co. v. Pace, 378 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1967)
(pilot is a "seaman'); Putnam v. Lower, 236 F.2d 561 (9th
Cir. 1956) (fisherman is a "seaman"); Gahagan Constr.
Corp. v. Armao, 165 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
333 U.S. 876 (1948) (deckhand is a "seaman!); Bailey v.
City of N.Y., 55 F. Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd., 153 F.2d
427 (2nd Cir. 1946) (engineer is a "seaman"); Militano v.
United States, 55 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (stevedore is
a "seaman"). But see Continental Gas Co. v. Thornden Line,
186 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1951); The Navemar, 41 F. Supp. 846
(E.D.N.Y. 1941) (purser is a "seaman").
19 Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991, 995 (1st Cir.
1941).
90 See the text quotation from Ex Parte Boyer cited in note 80
supra.
91 235 F.2d 309 (2nd Cir. 1956).
87
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er, so to hold would be to create a genre of 'seamen'
ineligible for the benefits of maintenance and cure,
yet equally barred
from recovery under the Long92
shoremen's Act.

Here the court held that a part time deckhand working on a
ferryboat crossing the Hudson River from New York to New
Jersey was a "seaman" entitled to recover maintenance and
cure. 93
Federal or State Jurisdictionand Workmen's Compensation
As was previously pointed out in connection with the
discussion of assumption of risk and contributory negligence,
where state law is in conflict with applicable admiralty principles, the former will generally yield to the latter.4 The
Supreme Court early held that no state law may be applied
in admiralty when the state law is in opposition to the federal law.95 More recently, in Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,6
Id. at 313. Note that the court specifically refers to maintenance and cure where the cases previously cited were
principally concerned with the Jones Act. The court further
stated: "Generally the criteria for determining whether or
not plaintiff is a 'seaman' for purposes of maintenance and
cure are the same as those governing his right to recovery
under the Jones Act." Weiss v. Central R.R., supra at 311
(court's citations omitted). It is submitted that where one
is a "seaman" for purposes of recovery under the Jones Act
and for maintenance and cure, he is also a "seaman" as to
seaworthiness.
9s Accord, Bailey v. City of N.Y., 55 F. Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y.
1944), affd., 153 F.2d 427 (2nd Cir. 1946).
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942);
Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124 (1936). See generally Diamond, Maritime Personal Injury; What Court, Judge or
Jury, 28 ALA. LAW. 387 (1967); Dodd, The New Doctrine of
the Supremacy of Admiralty Over the Common Law, 21
92

COLUm. L. REv. 647 (1921).
"

The Steamboat New York v. Rea, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 223
(1855).
346 U.S. 406 (1953). The court reiterated the rule originally
laid down in Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 247 U.S.
372 (1918).
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the Court reaffirmed its position, holding that in a maritime
action for personal injuries, the seaman's rights were to be
determined by admiralty rules and not by the laws of the
state in which the cause of action arose. It should be noted,
however, that in some areas, such as wrongful death actions,
state statutes may be applicable.9 7
Oklahoma is among the many states that have enacted
workmen's compensation legislation. The Oklahoma Act, as
previously mentioned, deprives an employer of the defenses
of assumption of risk and contributory negligence,99 and provides that the compensation provided for therein is an exclusive remedy as to the employments embraced. 0 0 The Act,
although not presently applicable to shipowner and seaman,' 0 '
could conceivably be amended to so apply. If our legislature
were to take such action, would our Workmen's Compensation
Act be a remedy to the exclusion of the maritime principles
97

The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). But note that the federal Death on the High Seas Act is applicable only to deaths
occurring beyond a marine league from shore. 46 U.S.C.
§ 761 (1964). See generally Carrie, The Choice Among State
L. REv. 297 (1968);
Laws in Maritime Death Cases, 21 V mD.
Annot., 1916A L.R.A. 1157. Note also that the exclusive
characteristic of federal admiralty jurisdiction ".

.

. does

not exclude state legislation upon matters of merely local
concern, which can be much better cared for under state
authority . . . nor does it exclude general legislation by

the states, applicable alike on land and water, in their exercise of the police power for the preservation of life and
health, though incidentally affecting maritime affairs; provided that such legislation does not contravene any acts
of congress, nor work any prejudice to the characteristic
features of the maritime law...

."

The City of Norwalk, 55

F. 98, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1893), aff'd, 61 F. 364 (2nd Cir. 1894).
98 OKLA. STAT. tit. 85 § § 2-176 (1954), as amended.
9) Id. § 12.
100 Id.
101 Note,

however, that the Act does apply to "hazardous"
employment on dredges. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85 § 2 (Supp=
1968).
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previously discussed? The answer is clearly in the negative.
As early as 1920, the Supreme Court held, in Knickerbocker
Ice Company v. Stewart,10 2 that Congress had no power to grant
to the states the right to apply their workmen's compensation
statutes in an admiralty situation. Congress had, in 1917,
amended the "savings clause" of the Judiciary Act of 1789
(as amended) to expressly allow seamen to prosecute their
rights under state workmen's compensation laws.103 This was
forbidden by the Supreme Court in Stewart:
[W]e think the enactment [of Congress] is beyond
the power of Congress. Its power to legislate concern102

103

253 U.S. 149 (1920); cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205 (1917).
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 originally provided
that federal district courts were to have original jurisdiction over admiralty matters "....

saving to suitors, in all

cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.. ." (Act of Sept. 24, 1789,
ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76). After Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205 (1917) was decided, Congress added to the
"savings clause" the following language: "[A]nd to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state . "."

(Act of October 6, 1917, ch.

97, § § 1, 2, 40 Stat. 395). This wording was defeated by the
Supreme Court in the Stewart case. Congress tried again
in 1922 by substituting the following language in place of
the wording used in the 1917 amendment: "[Alnd to claimants for compensation for injuries to or death of persons
other than the master or members of the crew of a vessel
their rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state . . . of the United States, which

rights and remedies when conferred by such law shall
be exclusive.

.

." (Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, §§ 1, 2, 42

Stat. 634). But the Supreme Court, in Washington v. W.C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) found even this language
objectionable and struck it down. Congress thereupon gave
up its attempt to force state workmen's compensation laws
upon admiralty and in 1948 again amended the "savings
clause" to virtually its original wording: "[S]aving to the
libellant or petitioner in every case any other remedy to
which he is otherwise entitled." (Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
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ing rights and liabilities within the maritime jurisdiction and remedies for their enforcement, arises from
the Constitution.... The definite object of the [Constitutional] grant was to commit direct control to the
Federal Government; to relieve maritime commerce
from unnecessary burdens and disadvantages incident
to discordant legislation; and to establish, so far as
practicable, harmonious and uniform rules applicable
throughout every part of the Union.10
The holding in Stewart was later extended to prohibit application of the state workmen's compensation statutes to certain persons other than the "master and members of the
crew" engaged in maritime activity.10 5
It is appropriate, at this point, to mention the federal
maritime workmen's compensation statute, known as t h e
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act.106
That Act, which provides compensation for certain injuries
as well as occupational illness sustained by longshoremen and
harbor workers, is exclusive as to the liability of the employer. 01 7 However, it is not applicable to "a master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the
master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under
eighteen tons net."' 08 Furthermore, that Act provides that it
646, § 1333, 62 Stat. 931). This wording underwent a minor
revision a year later and now reads "[S]aving to suitors
in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled." (28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964)).
104 253 U.S. at 164. But see Alaska Packers Ass'n. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n., 276 U.S. 467 (1928) where it was held
that in primarily local employments, the state workmen's
compensation legislation could apply.
105 Washington v. W. C. Dawson Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924). See
generally note 103 supra.
106 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1964).
107 Id. § 905. Note also that this section also abolishes the defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence and
fellow-servant.
108 Id. § 902 (3), 903 (a) (1).
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will be applicable only if the disability occurs on navigable
waters and then only if the state in question cannot lawfully
provide workmen's compensation.1 0 9 There necessarily results
from the above some overlapping of state and federal compensation acts or, as the Supreme Court once put it, there is
"that shadowy area within which, at some undefined and undefinable point, state laws can validly provide compensa' 0 Employees working on barges and dredges have, in
tion.""
some instances, been held to be "members of the crew" (or
seamen) and excluded from coverage by the Act."1 In other
instances, however, such workers have been held to be subject
to the Act." It is not difficult to envisage the problems which
will doubtless arise in determining the appropriate theory of
recovery for an injured (or ill) employee. Such employee may
be classified as a "longshoreman" or as a "harbor worker" and
therefore be covered by the federal Act or he may be afforded
relief by the Oklahoma Act. If neither the federal nor Oklahoma Act is applicable, the employee may be a "seaman" and
therefore entitled to protection under the general maritime
concepts of maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness or
under the Jones Act.118
109 Id. § 903 (a). But an award of compensation under a state
act will not preclude recovery under the federal act, the
award of the state being credited against the federal award.
Western Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.
1952).
110 Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249, 253
(1942).
"
See Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand & Gravel Co., 202
F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 817 (1953);
Gahagan Constr. Corp. v. Armao, 165 F.2d 301 (1st Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948).
112 See Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Willard, 189 F.2d
791 (2nd Cir. 1951); William Spencer & Son Corp. v. Lowe,
152 F.2d 847 (2nd Cir. 1945).
113 See generally Torts Along the Water's Edge: Admiralty or
Land Jurisdiction, 1938 U. ILL. L.F. 95.
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PART IV

SummaTy
Oklahoma attorneys who are either engaged in the practice of law or sit on the bench of a state or federal court in
Oklahoma, are naturally attuned to and familiar with Oklahoma law and practice. In order to recover in an ordinary
negligence action, the plaintiff must plead and prove the defendant's negligence. The defendant will usually attempt to
establish contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
knowing that to do so will completely exonerate his client
from liability. With regard to workmen's compensation litigation in this State (where practice is restricted to the Industrial Commission with an appeal to the Supreme Courtn4 ),
Oklahoma attorneys are aware of the fact that the defense
of contributory negligence, as well as those of assumption of
risk and the fellow-servant doctrine, have been abolished.
But with the arrival of the first commercial interstate
water traffic in eastern Oklahoma within the next few years,
and with it the first litigation involving seamen's injuries,
Oklahoma judges and attorneys will be forced to alter some
of their deeply ingrained legal conceptions. As pointed out
in Part I above, the admiralty actions of maintenance and
cure and unseaworthiness involve elements of liability without fault which make it unnecessary for the injured seaman
to plead and prove negligence on the part of the shipowner. 115
Furthermore, the concepts of assumption of risk and contributory negligence have no place in either of the admiralty
actions or in actions under the Jones Act, while the very unfamiliar comparative negligence rule is applicable to any litigation involving seamen's injuries. On the other hand, OklaOiA. STAT. tit. 85, § 26 (1954), id. § 29 (Supp. 1968).
115 Note however that as previously discussed, negligence is
an element which the seaman must plead and prove in an
action brought under the Jones Act. See the text material
in Part I and note 32 supra.
114
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homa's Workmen's Compensation Act, having abolished the
defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and
the fellow-servant doctrine, is in that respect similar to the
Jones Act and the rules applicable to maintenance and cure
and unseaworthiness. But, as previously noted, our Workmen's
Compensation Act is not expressly applicable to seamens' injuries at this time; 116 and in the event our legislature amends
the Act to cover seamen, the federal law will, nonetheless,
control.
In addition, an Oklahoma plaintiff's attorney may feel assured that r.es ipsa loquitur, in its traditional form, will be
virtually impossible to apply in a non-workman's compensation action between employee and employer. But again, the
Oklahoma lawyer must adapt his thinking to admiralty, where
a hybrid form of res ipsa loquitur has been employed by federal courts to infer a defendant's negligence under the Jones
Act or to establish the unseaworthiness of a vessel.
Perhaps the most perplexing problem which will face
Oklahoma's attorneys on both sides of the bench, will be determining exactly what law is applicable in a given situation.
As we have seen, if the injured (or ill) individual is a "seaman" serving aboard a "vessel" on "navigable" waters, he
most likely will be able to avail himself of the remedies of
maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, and the Jones Act,
or a combination of these remedies. If that is the case, the
admiralty rules and federal law will apply, in most instances,
to the exclusion of state law including our Workmen's Compensation Act. But where the injured individual is not a "seaman," or he is not serving on a "vessel," or the waters involved are not "navigable," neither the admiralty remedies
nor the Jones Act will apply, as the individual will probably
be covered by the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, perhaps in supplement to Oklahoma's
Workmen's Compensation Act. And it should be noted that
116

See note 101 supra.
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federal workmen's compensation cases will be tried in federal
district court rather than before our Industrial Commission.
The facts of each case will, of course, determine the direction
in which to proceed.
Conclusion
The writer has not attempted in this article to consider
in great depth any particular admiralty or federal remedy
available to the injured seaman. For example, there has been
no attempt to define exactly what constitutes "unseaworthiness," nor has there been a detailed analysis of the workings
of the Jones Act. Each of these subjects, as well as others,
have been and will be covered in separate papers by other
writers. What the writer has attempted to convey is an awareness that, with the advent of commercial water traffic in Oklahoma, certain admiralty and federal law, heretofore unknown and unfamiliar to Oklahoma, will be applicable to the
exclusion of traditional Oklahoma rules in the area of seamen's injuries. 117 The Oklahoma attorney should also become

familiar with other admiralty and federal rules such as those
concerning maritime liens and their priority, 118 the law of
117 The Tulsa Port of Catoosa has advised the writer that, in
the latest estimate of the U.S. Corps of Engineers, towboats from 600 to 5,000 h.p. and barges 195'x 35', 200'x 35',
250'x 52', and 175'x 26' are expected to ply the Arkansas
River to Tulsa from such points as New Orleans, Chicago,
Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Tampa. It is anticipated that
these vessels will transport up to 13.2 million tons of commodities annually including 3.9 million tons of petroleum
and its products, 1.2 million tons of coal, and 3.1 million
tons of iron and steel. Other products to be carried will
be cars, grain, sulphur, sugar, crude rubber, salt, phosphate
rock, and others. Letter fom I. E. Chenoweth, Transportation Consultant of the Port of Catoosa to W. Jay Jones,
April 7, 1969.
118

See generally 1. M. NoRmis, ThE LAw oF SEAmw §§ 442-445

(2nd ed. 1962).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1969

33

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 6 [1969], Iss. 3, Art. 3

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 6, No. 3

collision and of fault,"1 9 the Harter Act,120 the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 21 and the law of Marine Insurance, 122 all
of which may be applicable in Oklahoma. Also, in the event
that alien ships and seamen should ply the waters of the
Arkansas River and its tributaries, very complex problems of
international choice of lawm will be presented.
In view of today's federal and state workmen's compensation legislation as well as powerful maritime unions, the
contemporary seaman can hardly be considered the "ward
of the court" he once was. 2 4 It may be that the ancient admiralty remedy of maintenance and cure, and to a lesser degree the unseaworthiness remedy, are obsolete today insofar
as they apply to non-ocean going craft in inland waters. But
that will be the subject of other authors. It is submitted, however, that the admiralty and federal maritime rules, in whatever form they may be, should apply in all courts, both state
and federal, in the interest of uniformity. Shipping is an international, or at least in its narrowest sense, an interstate
industry which should not be fettered by a multitude of divergent local laws and procedures.
119 See generally ROBINSON, RoBINsoN ON ADmATY §§ 107116 (1939).
120 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1964).
121 46 U.S.C. § §1300-1315 (1964).
122 See generally V. DOVEm, A HA-DBOOK TO
mAPz INsuRmCE
(6th ed. 1962); W. RODDA, INLAND MARINE AND TRANSPORCE (2nd ed. (1958).
See generally RoBINsoN, RoBInsoN oN AUN~nTY §§ 28-34

TATION IWSURA

123
12

(1939).
See Jernigan v. Lay Barge Delta Five, 296 F. Supp. 127
(S.D. Tex. 1969) for a very recent case in which the court
refers to seamen as "wards of the court."
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